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THE CONSIDERATION OF A CONTRACT.
No. I.

§ 1.-Every parole contract, to be legally binding, must be supported by a consideration.' Benefit to the one party, or injury to
the other, is as indispensable to its validity as their mutual assent
or legal competency.
However deliberately made, and obligatory in morals, it will not,
unless authenticated by a seal, be recognized and enforced at law
or in equity This doctrine is of such high antiquity in the common law that no learning can find its origin.' It is enunciated in
the year books, 3 and illustrated by a multitude of cases in the succeeding English Reports.4
It is as thoroughly inwrought in the common law of the United:
States as of England. 5 It has been transferred to the courts of'
equity in both countries, where it remains in full force.5 Its analo12 Bla. Comm. 445; Doct. & Sta. Dial. 2, c. 24.
2

Bracton de leg lib. 8, cap. 1, fol. 99.

3 11 Hen. 4, 83,'23, a.; 17 ed., 4, 4; 3 Hen. 6, 36.
4

Eastwood vs. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438.
-2 Kent Comm. 463.
6 I Fonb. Eq. 348; 2 Story Eq. Juris., 793, a., 973, 987.
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gies have been traced in other systems of jurisprudence, ancient and
modern. It is said to be "echoed from the civil law,"' which
applied to commercial transactions the familiar maxim, "- x nudo
pacto non oritur actio.' But the nudum pactum of the civil law
was not synonymous with the voluntary promise which the comfmon
law leaves solely to the conscience of the maker to fulfill. It designated those engagements, oral and written, which were of no legal
effect, not having been invested with the prescribed solemnities.
But whenever they were entered into and ratified in the presence
of a magistrate, with certain formal interrogatories and replies, they
were presumed to be matured with deliberation, and became binding
in law, notwithstanding the duties they imposed on the one party
were to be recompensed by no service or reward by the other.3 The
commercial law of the Continent of Europe recognizes the principle
that "an obligation without a cause, or with a false or unlawful
cause, can have no effect ;" but will not allow agreements without
consideration to be questioned which have been duly ratified in the
presence of witnesses or a public notary. 4 Civilians, it is said, use
the word Mcusa in the same sense as the word consideration in the
jurisprudence of England and the United States.
§ 2.-The reason and policy of requiring a con8ideation.-A
consideration has been said to be necessary to sustain a parol promise, since it is requisite evidence of the promise itself. 6 Most
commonly the rulewhich requires it, is said to have been established
to protect parties from the consequences of inconsiderate engagements. Parol promises are liable to be made without reflection,
and should not be enforced unless the service promised by the one

IPillans vi. Mierop,

3 Burr. 1670, per Wilnot, J.

2

2 Bla. Comm., 445.

3 Addison on Cont., 2, 8."The old error that the nudum pactum of the civil law
and the gratuitous promise of te common law are synonymous, is now exploded.
See I Fonb. Eq. Bk., 1, ch. 5, 1, and a learned article on the NVudum Pactum, in
the English Law Review, May, 1849.
4 Code Civile, Lib. 3, Tit. 3, 4; Pothier, (Evans,) 42; Civil Code of Louisiana,
Art. .1887; Addison on Cont., 4.
"6Mouton vs. Noble, 1 La. Ann., 192; Sbarington vs. Stratton, Plowden, 809, (a.)
This is denied in the article cited above from the English Law Review.
Mierop, 8 Burr. 1669, per Lord Mansfield.
6 Pillans.
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party is to be remunerated by the other. On the contrary, it is
said a promise, contained in a sealed instrument which itself gives
evidence of reflection, requires no consideration to sustain it.' The
reason may be historically correct, and even now a written promise
implies more deliberation than a moral promise; but in reality,
under the existing usages of society, a sealed promise implies no
more than a written promise not under seal.
§ 3.-It seems to us that, whatever be the origin of this rule of
law, it rests on a sounder reason. If we understand its nature and
bearings, it is based on the right of property and the functions of
civil government. The great office of the law is to secure to every
individual that which is his own, whether in life, limb or estate.
The protection of persons, and of their rights of property, and the
conservation of social order, and not the enforcement of the decalogue is the business of the civil magistrate. If one wrongfully
seize upon and appropriate to his own use any portion of another's
property by force or fraud, the law will compel the aggressor to
restore it. It will also compel a person who has received a certain
portion of another's property, on condition of replacing it with a
corresponding value, to perform the condition. If he were at liberty to neglect its performance, the other's right of property would
be injured to as great an extent as if it had been seized by force,
inasmuch as he intended to part merely with a special representative of value, and not with the value itself.
Here the law stops. If an individual has parted with no value,
or has parted with it without the expectation or condition of having
it replaced, his right of property is not invaded when the law refuses to enforce promises made to him gratuitously. They are mere
moral obligations, binding on the conscience, which it is not the
office of civil government to execute. The consideration need not
amount to an equivalent in value-but it must be remembered that
the law abides by general principles with wide boundaries, which
on the whole work out their intended results. If the reason which
I Sharington vs. Stratton, Plowden, pp. 308, (a), 809; Shep. Touch., (Preston,)
pp. 224, 225; Doct & Stu. Dial. 2, c. 24; Addison on Cont., p. 5.
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supports the rule is sound, the policy which dictates adherence to it
is wise.
The enforcement of gratuitous promises would be followed by the
most mischievous consequences to society. The courts would be
crowded with interminable litigation. The voluntary engagements
of insolvent debtors would prejudice the just and meritorious claims
of actual creditors. Assignees, executors and administrators would
meet with new difficulties in distributing the property committed by
law to their charge.' These remarks are induced by the unfavorable criticism to which the rule is not unfrequently subjected.2
§ 4.-The relation of the considerationto the contract.-Inevery
contract there are in fact two considerations. This is illustrated
by mutual contemporaneous promises. If you offer me $100 for a
watch, and I, accepting your offer, promise to give you the watch
for the money, a valid contract is created. The money to be paid
is the consideration of the promise to part with the watch, and the
w;atch to be delivered is the consideration- of the promise to part
with the money.
§ 5.-The consideration of a promise may consist of some benefit
to the party making it, or some injury to the party to whom it is
made.' It may consist of some benefit conferred on a third person
at the request of the party making the promise, who may himself
receive none whatever, either from the beneficiary or from the party
to whom it is made.4 An equal injury results to the promisee
whether he confers the benefit on the promisor or on a third person.' Promises supported by a consideration moving to a third
person occur most frequently when the promisor guarantees or
ensures the debt of another, either contemporaneously with or subsequently to its creation. If it be made contemporaneously, no
I Eastwood

vs. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & E. 438; S. C., 2 P. & D., 276; Stfry Bailm.

169.
21 Fonb. Eq., 337, note; English Law Review, May, 1849, Art. Nudum Pactum;
Fitch vs. Redding, 4 Sandf., 130, per Duer, J.
3 Corn. Dig.. Ass. B. 1; Pillans vs. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1673; Nerot vs. Wallace, 3 T.
R. 24; Bunn vs. Guy, 4 East 194.
4Morley vs. Boothby, 3 Bing. 113.
5 Violet vs. Patton, 5 Cranch, 150.
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other consideration for the collateral promise need be shown than
that for the debt itself, it being conclusively presumed- that the
credit would not have been given without the additional sccurity.'
But if the guaranty be of some previously existing debt, some new
consideration, as forhearance by the creditor, must be shown to
render it valid-for without such new consideration the creditor
would sustain no damage and the debtor receive no benefit. 2
§ 6.-Oontracts which require a consideration.-All contracts,
not under seal, whether written or oral, require a consideration.
In 1765, Mr. Jstice Wilmot was strongly of opinion, and Lord
Mansfield apparently so, that a written promise, not under seal,
carrying with it the evidence of deliberation, required no consideration ;5 but their opinion is now in conflict with all approved authority.4
There is no difference between an oral and a written promise not
under seal, and both are classed together under the head of simple
5
or parole contracts.
§ T.-Bills of exchange and promissory notes are governed by the
same rules as other parole contracts, with certain peculiar modifications. They require a consideration to sustain them when matters
of suit between immediate parties. The drawer of a bill cannot
recover against the acceptor-the payee of a note against the
maker-or the indorsee of either a bill or note against his immediate indorser, unless the bill or note passed to him for a valuable
consideration. 6 A want of consideration or any other equities
IBrown vs. Garbrey Gould, 94; Kirby vs. Coles, 3 Cro. Eliz. 137 ; Stadt vs. Lill,
9 East, 348; Leonard vs. Vrendenberg, 8 Johns. 29; Bailey vs. Freeman, 11 Id. 221;
Tenny vs. Prince, 4 Pick. 385.
2 1 Saunders (Williams) 211, note; Thacher vs. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 801; Parker
vs. Carter, 4 Munf. 273; Bigler vs. Ream, 3 Penn. 283; Payne vs. Wilson, 7 B. &
C. 423; Croft vs. Beale, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 408.
3 Pillans vs. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1669-1671.
4 Rann vs. Hughes, 7 T. R. 851; 4 Taunt. 117; 1 Saund. 211, note (2); Burnet vs.
Blisco, 4 Johns. 235; The People vs. Howell, 4 Id. 803; Cooke vs. Bradley, 7 Conn.
51 ; Brown vs. Adams, 1 Stewar 51: Bean vs. Burbank, 16 Maine, 459.
5 Rana vs. Hughes, 7 T. R. 351, note; Beckham vs. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79; Ballard vs. Walker, 3 Johns. Cas..65.
6 Jackson vs. Warwick, 7 T. R. 121; Darnellhs. Williams, 2 Stark, 160; Jones vs.
Hibbert, 2 Id. 304; Herrick vs. Carman, 10 Johns. 224; Hill vs. Ely, 5 S. & R. 363;
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attaching to the bill or note between the immediate parties, will
defeat a recovery by a subsequent holder to whom it passed for a
valuable consideration after it became due,' or after actual or constructive notice of the infirmity,2 or otherwise not in the ordinary
course of business. 3 These incidents are allowed by the law to
determine the commercial character of such instruments in accordance with the actual or supposed intention of the parties.
§ 8.-The unimpeded circulation of negotiable paper is so necessary in commercial life, that bills and notes are awarded peculiar
privileges, which enable those who purchase them for valuable consideration to rely on the credit of all the previous parties, without
inquiring into their business relations among themselves; but the
rule must be taken subject to the conditions just stated. If they
have passed into the hands of a bona fide holder for value before
maturity, no infirmity unknown to him when he purchased them,
arising from want, failure or illegality of consideration, whether
existing in the inception of the bill or note, or created at any time
before the transfer to him, not even the theft of the indorser can be
4
alleged in bar of an action brought by him against any prior party.
So if such bonafide holder indorses a note, any prior equities which
existed between the parties before its transfer to him cannot prejudice the rights of this indorsee, notwithstanding the indorsee had
notice of them when he received the note; for otherwise, the rights
Hill vs. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 391; Story, Prom. Notes, 390; 3 Kent Comm. 80.
There are early dicta which seem to imply that bills and notes require no consideration to sustain them. Pillans vs. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1669, per Lord Mansfield; 2 Bla.
Comm. 446,
1Taylor vs. Mather, 3 T. R. 83, -note; Ayer vs. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; Stockbridge vs. Damon, 5 Pick. 223; Sargent vs. Southgate, Id. 312; Thompson vs. Hall,
6 Id. 229; Tucker vs. Smith, 4 Greenl. 415."
'Steers vs. Lashley, 6 T. R. 6i; Wifen vs. Roberts, 1 Esp. 261; Lovell vs. Martin, 4 Taunt. 799; Amory vs. Merryweather, 2 B & C. 573; Skilding vs. Warren,
15 Johns. 270; Perkins vs. Challis, 1 N. H. 254.
"Munrce vs. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412; Aldrich vs. Warren, 16 Maine, 465; Story,
Prom. Notes, i 190; 3 Kent's Comm. 80.
4 Miller vs. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Grant vs. Vaughan, 3 Id. 1516; Peacock vs.
Rhodes, 2 Doug. 633; Solomons vs. The Bank of England, 13 East, 135; Aldrich
vs. Warren, 16 Maine, 465; Wheeler vs. Guild, 20 Pick. 545; Clark vs. Ricker, 14
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of such bona fide holder would be unjustly impaired. 1 Nor will it
avail the maker of an accommodation note in an action brought by
an indorsee, who gave value for it, before it was due, to prove that
the indorsee knew it to be an accommodation note-such a note
being designed to circuilate like any other negotiable paper which
rests on a valid consideration between the original parties.2 These
remarks must be confined to those bills and notes which are properly
commercial, being negotiable, unconditional and payable in money s
The privileges allowed to the holders of such paper in proving the
consideration, will be noticed under another head.
§ 9.-The rule of law which renders a consideration indispensable
to the validity of a parole contract, does not apply to sealed instruments, as bonds, deeds, &c.4 They are said to "im1vo t a consideration," 5 but this expression seems to mean nothing more than
that they require none. It has doubtless been adopted so as to
class together and apply to all contracts, sealed and unsealed, by
means of a fiction,-the rule that a consideration is necessary to
their validity. Want or failure of consideration has been allowed
in some American States by statute or local usage to invalidate
sealed agreements ;6 and with deference it is submitted, that the
arbitrary rule which originated when written agreements were generally sealed, and now allows the impression of a wafer or scrawl to
change the general policy of the law, has lost its efficacy in promoting the ends of justice. A single exception is said to exist to
N. H. 44. But when declared absolutely void by statute, they are void even in the
hands of innocent holders. Story's Notes, 192; 3 Kent's Comm. 79, 80; Hay s.
Ayling, 3 Eng. Law & Eq. 420; Unger vs. Boas, 13 Penn. State (1 Harris) 601.
1 Chalmers vs. Lanion, 1 Camp. 383; Thompson vs. Shepherd, 12 Met. 311;
Story's Notes, 191.
2 Ireland vs. Beresford, 6 Dow. 237; Fentun vs. Pocock, 5 Taunt. 192; Lincoln
vs. Stevens, 7 Met. 52.9; Grandin v. Levoy, 2 Paige, 509; Powell vs. Waters, 17
Johns. 176.
3 Story's Notes,
17-27.
4 Sharington vs. Stratton, Plowden, 308; Addison on Cont. 5; see Morley vs.
Boothby, 3 Bing. 111.
I Sharington v8. Stratton, Plowden, 308'; 2 Kent's Comm. 264.
6N. Y. R. S. vol. ii. p. 406, 77, 78; Indiana R. S. p. 451; Swift vs. Hawkins,
1 Dall. 16; Solomon vs. Kimball, 5 Binney, 232 ; Case vs. Boughton, 11 Wend. 116;
Leonard vs. Bates, 1 Blackf. 172.
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the rule we have stated. Contracts under seal, stipulating for" a
reasonable restraint of trade, must have a consideration.'
§ 10-Te Proof of a 0onsderation.-The consideration of an
oral promise may be proved by writtdn or parole evidence. Written
contracts, so far as proof of the consideration is concerned, are
susceptible of a division into those which are put in writing, at the
option of the parties and those which, to be valid, are required to be

put in writing by statute.
The consideration of written contracts of the first class not under
seal, may be proved by'parole evidence, or collected from the circumstances of the case, and it must bie averred when they are
matters of suit.2 They are not in general ever prestmed to be
founded on a consideration, unless on the face of them one either
appears or is stated to exist. But, unilike other unsealed- instruments, negotiable paper is favored with this presumption, and is
presumed to have been delivered for a valUable consideration, both
in its original inception and subsequent indorseeit. 4 "The burden
of proof may be casi on the holder by proving force or'fraud in the
inception or issue of the bill or note, to which he'was not privy.5
I Mitchel vs. Reynolds,

2

1 P. W. 181; Homer vs. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322.
Twingley vs. Cutter, 7 Conn. 291; Arms vs. Ashley, 4 Pick. 71; Bean vs.,Bur-

bank, 16 Maine, 451; Cummings vs. Dennet, 26 Id. 397; Patchin vs. Swift, 21 Vt.
292; Thompson vs. Blanchard, 3 Comst. 335; Monton vs. Noble, 1"La. Ann. 192;
Powell on Cont. 368. Contra, Morley vs. Boothby, 3 Bing. 112, Best, C. J
3Whitney vs. Stearns, 26 Maine, 394; Bean vs. Burbank, Id. 459; Sloane vs
Gibson, 4 Miss. 33; Thompson vs. Blanchard, 3 Comst. 339; Bronson C. T.
4 Collins vs. Martin, 1 B. & P. C., 648; Solomons vs. Bank of England, 13 East.
135; Thompson vs. Blanchard, supra, 1 Selwyn, N. P. 42; Story Notes, 181, 3
Kent's Comm., 79; Jennison vs. Stafford, 1 Cush. 168. This privilege is awarded
to promissory notes in Ohio; even though contingent and not negotiable, if payable
in money. Dugan vs. Campbell, 1 Hamm. 118 ; Ring vs. Foster, 6 Ia..280. but
not when payable in specific articles and amounting to a special contract. Niswanger
vs. Staley, 8 West. Law Jour., 493.
r Reynolds vs. Cheetle, 2 Camp. 596; Munroe vs. Cooper, 5 Pick, 212; Aldrich
vs Warren, 16 Maine, 465 ; Cruger vs. Armstrong, 3 Johns, Cas. 5; Conroy vs.
Warren, Id. 259; Bailey vs. Bidwell, 13 M. & W., 73, 3 Kent. Comm., 79. In
Wyer vs. The Dorchester and Milton Bank, a case not yet reported, it was recently
held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that the case of bank bills, stolen
from the bank, was an exception to this rule. See Bank of Louisiana vs. U. S.
Bank, 9 MIsrtin, 398; Hope Bridge Co. vs. Perry, 11 Ill.
467.
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It has been held that another and different consideration from
that stated in a deed or an additional one, even in a parole written
contract, unless expressed on its face to be "for other considerations," cannot be averred, and this on the ground that the -written
agreement would other~se be varied by evidence aliunde.1 But
this doctrine is now decidedly against the weight of American
authority, and parole evidence is admissible to prove the consideration of a deed or other written contract in which none is eipressed, or
to prove another and different one from that expressed, or to contradict the receipt of the consideration acknowledged in the deed.'
§ 11.-The second class of written contracts-those which, to be
valid, must be in writing, present the vexed question whether the
consideration of those contracts to which the statute of frauds denies
legal validity, unless reduced to writing may be proved by parole
evidence. 3 A promise which the statute requires to be in writing,
as well as one which it does not, must have a consideration. It
merely adds a further requisite to certain contracts which prior to
its enactment required a consideration.4
§ 12.-Public policy seems to require that the classes of promises
enumerated by the statute should not be enforced, unless made
under circumstances of peculiar deliberation, and proved, by more
reliable.evidence than the uncertain testimony of witnesses to unwritten declarations.' If to effect this requirement of public policy
I Howes vs. Baker, 3 Johns, 506; Maigley vs. Hauer, 7 Id. 341; Leonard vs.
Vrendenherg, 8 Id. 29; Schermerhorn vs. Vanderheyden, Id. 139; Shepherd vs.
Little, 14 Id. 210; Bowen vs. Bell, 20 Id. 388; Elliott vs. Giese, 7 H. & J. 457;
Emery vs. Chase, 5 Greenl. 132; Cutter vs. Reynolds, 8 B. Monrs. 596.
'Tyler vs. Carlton, 7 Greenl. 175 ; Emmons vs. Littlefleld. 13 Maine, 233; Willson
vs. Betts 4 Denio, 101; McCrea vs. Purmount, 16 Wend. 460; Frink vs. Green, 5
Barb. 455; Livermore vs. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 431; White vs. Miller, 22 Vt. 380;
Sedgwick on Dam, 172, 174.
'29 Car. 11 ch. 3 4, adopted substantially in all American States. 2 Kent.
Comm. 510, 1 Greenl. Ev. 262, 274.
• Rann vs. Hughes, 7 T. R., 351 ; 2 Stark Ev. 341.
1 Greenl. Ev., 262 and note, where similar protective statutes are cited. The
same policy dictates the requirement by statute of a written promise to revise a
debt--barred by the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy.
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be the sole purpose of the statute, as gathered from its general scope
and particular terms, the simple affirmation of the party to be
charged, referring definitely to the subject matter, seems to be all
that need be reduced to writing. The promise "I guaranty the
debt of B to 0," is more deliberate when written than when merely
spoken, and is not less deliberate than the written promise "I
guaranty the debt of B to C in consideration of C's forbearance to
sue B." True it is, that a consideration must still be proved by
parolk evidence, if it is not written-but the introduction of such
evidence would not conflict with the purpose of the statute as we
have stated it. Even if the consideration also were required to be
in writing, parole evidence could not then be dispensed with. The
agreement by the statute ne6d only be signed by the party to be
charged-but in order to bind him, parole evidence may andin many
cases must show, among other things, that the consideration -has
been performed, if its performance was to precede the fulfillment of
the promise. If we go further than requiring merely the promisd
to be in writing, and require the coisideration also to be written,
on the same principle we must shut out parole evidence of the obligation resting on the party from whom the consideration moved, to
perform it, and its faithful discharge, of the mutual- assent of the
contracting parties and of every element necessary to constitute a
valid contract. The construction here giNen answers the terms of
the statute which invite a liberal construction, requiring "1the agreement or some note or memorandum thereof" to be in writing. The
word "agreement" is used in the statute as synonymous with promise, which is its popular signification. In law books it is not used
as including a consideration, except-in defining such an one as the
law will enforce-but agreements are classed not unfrequentlyas
"valid" and "invalid," " legal" and "illegal."
§ 13.-The case, which first raised the point under discussion,
occurred one. hundred and twenty-eight years after the enactment
of the statute,' prior to which case Lord Eldon said he always supposed the law clear: that if a man agreed in writing to pay the debt
I Wain v8.

Walters, 5 East, 10.
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of another, it was not necessary that the consideration should appear in writing.'
The English decisions, after no little conflict of opinion,2 settled
the doctrine of Wain vs. Waltera, requiring the consideration of all
agreements included within the fourth section to appear in writing,
either by express statement or just implication. 3
The decisions proceeded to a certain extent, on the ground that
as the agreement must be in writing, the consideration, which is
one of its material parts and is indispensable to its recognition in
courts of justice, should also be in writing, for otherwise parol evidence would add a necessary element, and thus open the way to the
perjuries which the statute was intended to prevent. They, however, rested mainly on the assumption that the word agreement
e vi termini includes a consideration which must therefore be reduced to writing.
Accordingly, it was held, in construing the seventeenth section in
which the words "bargain" and "contract" alone were used, that
the consideration need not be expressed.' Either construction
satisfies the terms of the statute, and will be adopted accordingly,
as it is supposed to be more or less extensive in its design, and is
regarded with favor or distrust by the Courts. The En glish rule
has been adopted in New York,5 Maryland 6 and Georgia, 7 and re1 Ex parte Gordon, 16 Vesey, 286.
EX parte Minet%14 Vesey, 190; ex parte Gordon upra; Morris vs. Bromley,
E
Holt N. P. 153; Goodman vs. Chase, 1 B. & AL. 299.
3
Saunders vs. Waterfield, 4 B. & AL 295; Jenkins vs. Reynolds, 8 B. & B. 14,
S. G. 6 Moore, 681, and cases cited in notes to ex parte Minet, 14 Vesey, (Sumner's
ed.) 190.
E gerton vs. Matthews, 6 East. 307. Also, it has been held in New York, where
the English rule has been adopted, that where a statute required an "undertaking"
to be in writing, the consideration need not be expressed. Thompson vs. Blanchard,
3 Comst. 335.
5 Sears vs. Brink, 8 Johns. 210; Leonard vs. Vrendenbergh, 8 Id. 29; Rogers vs.
Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218; Parker vs. Wilson, 15 Id. 343; Bennett vs. Pratt, 4 Denio,
275; Staats vs. Howlett, 4 Id. 559; D. Wolf vs. Rabaud, 1 Peters, 499.
6 Wyman vs. Giay, 4 H. & J. 409; Eliott vs. Giese, 4 Id. 458; Edelen vs. Gough,
5 Gill. 103. But see Brooks vs. Dent, 1 Mary. Ch. Decis. 523.
Henderson vs. Johnson, 6 Geo. 390.
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cognized in New Hampshire;' but it has been gradually frittered
away in New York till it has been held that the words "for value
received" are a sufficient expression of the consideration.2 In other
States parol evidence has been held admissible to prove it, and this
doctrine has been sanctioned by the weight of. American authorities. 3 The same construction has been followed in one or two cases
because the statute uses the word "Promise" instead of "agreement,"-as in Virginia, Tennessee and Mississippi.4
§ 14.-Where a promise to pay the debt of another, which is
within the statute, is collateral to the principal contract, and being
made at the same time and forming part of the same transAction,
becomes an essential ground of the credit given to the principal
debtor, no other consideration need be shown for the guaranty than
that for the original debt; and this may be proved by parol evidence under those governments where the consideration" is requihed
to be in writing. But they require some other coisideration to
exist and appear in writing, if it is the guaranty Tf a previously
existing debt.5
§ 15.-Partesto the considerationof a contract, and ter rights
and liabilitie. -The consideration of a promise, as has been seen,
may consist of a benefit conferred on the promissor or on a third
person at his request. If the benefit is conferred by the party to
I Neelson

vs. Sanborne, 2 N. H. 414.
2 Watson vs. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557; S. C. 26 Id. 425; Douglas vs.'Howland,
24 Id. 35; Edelen vs. Gough, 5 Gill. 103.
3 Packard vs. Richardson, 17 Mass. 122; Levy vs. Merrill, 4 Greenl. 180; Cummings vs. Desmett, 26 Maine, 397; Sage vs. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Miller vs. Irvine,
1 Dev. N. C. 103; Tufts vs. Tufts, 8 W. & M. 456; How vs. Kimball, 2 McLeail,
103; Reed vs. Evans, 17 Ohio, 128; Buckley vs. Beardsley, 2 South. 570. The
contrary was held in South Carolina in Stephens vs. Winn, 1 N. & M. 370, but
overruled in Lecat vs. Yard, 2 McCord, 188; Tyler vs. Givens, 3 Hill. 480; Woodward vs. Picket, Dudley, 30.
4 Violet vs. Patton, 5 Cranch 142 ; Taylor vs. Ross, 3 Yerg. 830 ; Wren vs. Pearce,
4 S. & M. 91 ; Thompson vs. Blanchard, 3 Comst. 835.
r Leonard vs. Vrendenbergb, 8 Johns., 29; Nelson vs. Dubois, 13 Id., 175; Rogers
vs. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218; S. C., 13 Id. 114; Brown vs. Curtis, 2 Comst., 225;
Story Notes, 457; 3 Kent. Comm., 122, 123; Stadt vs. Lill, 9 East, 848; Newberry vs. Armstrong, 6 Bing. 201.
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whom the promise is made, and he is to receive the benefit of the
promise, he can, doubtless, enforce it, as he is both a party to the
consideration and the promise. But questions of difficulty arise
where the party who is to receive the benefit of the promise is a
stranger to both the consideration and the promise, or to either.
The rules relative to them are somewhat arbitrary, and not rested
on any general principles of jurisprudence. They have been variously stated by different courts and commentators on the law. By
some it is stated, as a general rule, that the beneficiary or third
party for whose benefit a promise is made cannot sue upon it, at
least in his own name, at law, and by others that he can-though
the consideration does not move from him.2 By others it is said,
he cannot sue unless he was privy to the original contract or the
promissee is his agent-denying his right to sue when he is an
entire stranger to the consideration.3 In the early cases it was
generally held that the party from whom the consideration moved,
and to whom the promise was made, could alone bring the action.4
The beneficiary was allowed to sue in one or two instances-either
because he performed the meritorious service, which constituted the
consideration or was related to the promisee, as when a promise was
made to a parent for the benefit of his son or daughter, the latter
was allowed to sue.5 In others the suit was sustained, the promisee
being regarded as the plaintiff's agent. 6 In modern cases it has
been held that the third party could bring the action, provided he
was privy to the contract-and different rules have been adopted to
determine this privity. Where money has been paid by one party
to another for the benefit of a third party, that third party has not
been allowed to sue, unless he previously assented to the payment,
and his right to the money became so fixed that it was at his risk and
I Hammond on Parties,

(11 Am. Ed.,) 101.
2 22 Am.' Jurist, 17.
Chitty Cont., (6 Am. Ed.,) 68; W. W. Story Cont., J 450.
4 Crow vs. Rogers, 1 Str., 592; Delabor v&."
Gold, 1 Keb. 44, 121; Bourne vs.
-Mason, 1 Vent., 6; S. C., 2 Keb., 457, 527.
6 Dutton vs. Poole, 1 Vent. 818, 322; S. C., 2 Lev., 211; 1 Freem. 471; T. Jones,
102; T. Ray, 302; Bourne v;. Mason, 1 Vent. 6.
6 Savile, 23; Latch, 206.
3
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could not be recalled, or its destination otherwise changed by the
act of the party by whom it was deposited.' Such a rule would
allow the third party to maintain an action only when the party
to whom the promise was made was under some legal obligation
to him. But even under the operation of this rule, the beneficiary could enforce the trust in equity without a prior revocation.2 The debtors of an insolvent party, laving with his
assent agreed with his creditors to satisfy their claims against
him, -were held liable to the suit of the creditors, the arrangement

between all the parties operating to render the amount due to the
8
insolvent money had and received to the use of the creditors
Even the siniple promise of the party who has agreed.to confer the
benefit, repeated to the beneficiary himself, has been considered
sufficient to render the latter privy to the agreement.'
The necessity of the beneficiary's proving his privity to the contract is noW generally dispensed with, at least in this country. The
doctrine for which there are early precedents, aud which has always
been law in Massachusetts since the first publication of her reports,
that where one person makes a promise on a valid consideration for
the benefit of a third persdn,. although such third person has in no
wise contributed to the consideration, either the party.to whom the
promise was made or the party for whose benefit it was made may
maintain an action thereon, each in his own name, is affirmed by
the mass of later authorities.5 In one or two early cases the right
I Seaman vs.

Whitney, 24 Wend., 260; Williams vs. Everett, 14 East, 582; Tier-

nan vs. Jackson, 6 Peters, 595, 601. See distinctions taken in Blymire vs. Boistle, 6
Watts, 182; Harvet vs. Lewis, Hetl. 176; Owings vs. Owings, 1 H. & G., 484; Hammond on Parties, (11 Am. Ed.,) 101.
2 2 Story Eq. Juris,
1041, 1044.
3 Wilson vs. Coupland, 5 B. & AL, 228; Tipper vs. Becknell, 3 Bing. N. C., 710;
Parsons on Cont., 187, 192.
4 But this must be confined to those cases where the third party is the creditor of
the depositor of money. Wyman vs. Smith, 2 Sandf., 331.
5
Savile, 23; Hardr. 821; 1 Roll. Abr., 37, pl. 25; 32, pl. 13; 1 Viner Ab.,
834-5; Com. Dig. Ass., (E.) Yelv. 25; Feltmakers vs. Davis, 1 B. & P., 101, note;
Martyn vs. Hind, Cowp., 443; Lilly vs Hayes, 5 A. & E., 550; Felton vs. Dickinson, 10 Mass., 287; Hall v. Maiston, 17 Id., 571; Arnold'vs. Lyman, Id., 400;
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of action was conceded to the beneficiary alone.' But if the contract be under 8eal, the third party, for whose benefit it was made,
cannot sue upon it in his own name. 2

§ 16.-If the beneficiary or third party is the creditor of the party
to whom the promise was made, and has not accepted the promisor
as a new debtor in his stead, on general principles he would be
allowed to sue his original debtor. It is evident also, that if the
promisee was not indebted to the beneficiary at the time of the

deposit, or the debt for the discharge of which it was made, had
ceased to exist, or still existing, the beneficiary had not accepted
the promisor in lieu of the promisee as his debtor in either and all

of these cases, the depositor could recover the money of the party
to whom he delivered it, if he had not already paid it over, at least,

before any engagement had been entered into by him with the
beneficiary to h6ld it for his benefit.

§ 17.-It is said that in the case of a promise to A. for the benefit
of B., and an action brought by B. to enforce it, the promise must
be laid as being made to B., and the promise actually made to A.

may be given in evidence to support the declaration. 4

But the con-

trary rule which allows thepromise to be stated according to thefact,
Carnegie vs. Morrison, 2 Met, 401-4; Beers vs. Robinson, 9 Barr, 229; Hind vs.
Holdship, 2 Watts, 106; Hassenger vs. Solmes, 5 S. &R. 4; 8 Johns., 258; 12 Id.,
276; Shear vs. Mallory, 13 Id, 496; Berly vs. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577; The Del. and H.
Canal Co. vs. Westchestei Co. Bank, 4 Denlo, 97; 1 Cranch, 429; Hinkley vs. Fowler,
15 Maine, 285; Lucas vs. Chamberlain, 8 B. Monroe, 76; Belt vs. McLaughlin, 12
Miss., 433. So a promise to three, on a consideration moving from them and a
fourth person, will support an action brought by three. Cabot vs. Haskins, 8
Pick., 83.
1 Hadres vs. Levet, HetL, 176; S. C. Cro. EI., 619, 652; Dutton vs. Poole, T.
Jon., 102.
2 Hinkley vs. Fowler, 15 Maine, 285; Yelv., 177, note; Sanders vs. Filley, 12
Pick., 554; Johnson vs. Foster, 12 Met., 167.
3 Carnegie vs. Morrison, 2 Met. 402; 2 Story Eq. Juris. - 10, 46-6.
Even an
accepted order requires a consideration for the acceptance to render it binding.
Davis vs. McGrath, 10 Barr 170; Ford vs. Adams, 2 Barb. 849. The topic of
novation to which this point belongs, is well treated in Parsons on Contracts,
pp. 187, 192.
4Feltmakers vs. Davis, 1 B. & P. 102; Eyre, C. J. Lawes' Assumpsit, 93, 97;
22 Am. Jur. 18.
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or its legal effect is more just and liberal, and is sustained by early
authorities as well as by one quite recent.1 When a party contracts
as agent, and avows himself acting as such, he cannot, except in
some peculiar cases, bring the action, the consideration actually
moving from the principal, and the promise being constructively
made to him.'
§ 18.-Having now reviewed the general doctrines of a consideration, its analogies, its reason and policy, and examined it in its relation, to the contract, determining what contracts require it, the
mode of proving it, the parties to it, and their rights of'suit, we are
now to determine what is necessary to its vaZidity, classifying such
consideration as are sufficient and such as are insufficient in law to
sustain a contract. Knd first:
§ 19 .- The amount of a considerationrequired.-Theconsideration need not be adequate.3 In other -words, a valid contract may
subsist betwben'parties by which the something to be given or done
by the one is far from being an equivalent in intrinsic value to the
thing to be given'.or done bythe other. This doctrinehas been stated
in very strong terms by the courts. Ithas been said, "' The law does
not weigh the quantum of the consideration." "The least spark of
of a consideration will be sufficient." '4 "Any gain to the promisor

I Dutton vs. Poole, 2-Lev. 210; S. C. T. Jones, 102; T. Ray, 802; The Del. and H.
Canal Co. vs. Westchester Co. Bank, 4 Denio, 97; See Ben vs. Chaplain Hadr, 821:
where the promise in such case, it issaid, must be laid according to the fact.
2
40-3, 410; Bickerton vs. Burrell, 5 M. &
Chitty Cont. 54; Story Agency,
S. 883.
3Whitfield vs. MeLeod, 2 Bay, 880; Knobb vs. Lindsay, 5 Ohio, 468; Stewart vs.
The State, 2 H. & G. 114; Bainbridge vs. Firmston, 1 P. & D. 2; Skeate pa, Beall,
11 A. & E. 992; Oakley vi. Boorman, 21 Wend. 593. Annuities cannot be set aside
for inadequacy of consideration,-8 Ves. 133 ; McGee vs. Morgan, 2 Sch..& Lef. 895;
Floyer vs. Sherard, Arnb. 18; Speed vs. Phillips, 8 Anst. 732. It is now no objection to a contract in lawful restraint of trade: Hitchcock vs. Coker, 6 A. & E, 488,
456 ; Sainter vs. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716 ; Pierce vs. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223.
4
Pillans vs. Mierop, 3 Burr, 1666, 1663; Per Wilmot, J. Austyn vs. M Lane, 4
Dall. 225 ; 3 Penn. 282; Whitney vs. Stearns, 16 Maine, 397; Sanborn vs. French,
2 Foster, N. H. 246.
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or loss to the promisee, however trifling,' is a sufficient consideration
to support an express promise." 1
§ 20.-The general doctrine' of a consideration, we have seen, is
founded on the established principles of public policy.2 The rule of
law which prohibits Courts in all ordinary cases from inquiring into
its value or amount is sound in reason, and expedient in practice.
The price or exchangeable value of a thing is not governed solely
by its intrinsic value, but depends upon contingencies which hardly
two men will weigh alike. These fluctuate every day, and are
regulated by no unvarying standard. A sentiment may be attached
to an article generally esteemed of trivial value, which may render
it priceless to some. It would be impracticable for. any human
tribunal to revise contracts with the view of equalizing the obliga-.
tions imposed'on both parties, and impossible, for their motives could
not be balanced. None could stand and none could be made-if
thus subjected to the scrutiny of courts. To use the bold metaphor
of an English Judge, "if they were to unravel all such transactions,
they would throw everything into confusion, and set afloat the contracts of mankind." 3 For reasons like these, it has become a settled
doctrine of the Common law, binding in general on Courts of law
and equity, to which there are analogies in other systems of jurisprudence, that a promise will be enforced, founded on a consideration consisting of the slightest benefit to the maker, or the slightest
damage to the party to whom it is made.4 Thus, a promise to pay
a sum of money if the person to whom it is made will go before a
I Train vs.

Gold, 6 Pick. 384; Hubbard vs. Coolidge, 1 Met. 93; Mansfield vs.

Corbin, 2 Cush. 151.
2 Ante, J3.
3

Griffith vs. Spratley, 1 Cox, 383.

4

See cases cited ante

19.

Per Lord Ch. Baron Eyre.

The law of Scotland is the same. Erskine's Inst.
Bk. 4, Tit., 1. 27. The rule of the civil law is the same relative to personal property.
Domat. Bk. I.,Tit. 2, H 3, 9, art. 1 ; Pothier (Evans) 33, 34, note. But as regards
real property, the sale was set aside, if the purchase money was less than one-half
of the whole value. Domat. Bk. I., Tit. 2 J 9; 1 Story Eq. Jur. 247-8-9.
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magistrate and make oath or affidavit that it is due to him' or procure an order from a third person directing its payment,' or call for
it at a particular time-or prove it to be due him before a legal
tribunal 4-- or deliver up a letter or other document in his lawful
possession--or show a deed 5-- or merely endeavor to do any lawful
service Jis binding when the condition is performed. 8 The sale of
a chattel, which turns out to be utterly worthless, is a sufficient consideration-there being no fraud or warranty. 9 But the stipulated
consideration must consist of some benefit to the one party or injury
to the other, either actual or possible, and the grant of a mere estate
at will or the performance of a legal duty by the promisee will not
satisfy the relui.ement of the law.' °
§ 21.-But to the rule that inadequacy of consideration is no
objection to a contract, there are some important qualifications or
explanations which must not be passed over. It is a very prominent fact in 'connection with circumstances of distress, improvidence
oi mental incompetency, from which fraud may be presumed, so as
to avoid a contract and induce a court of equity to set it aside when
executed." But if fraud is not charged, or if charged is disproved,
IBretton vs. Prettiman, T. Ray, 153, S. C. 2 Keb. 26, 44; 1 Sid. 283, Peake Cas.
187; Amy vs. Andrews, 1 Freem. 133, S. C., 1 Mod. 166, Cro. Eliz. 469; and .the
truth of the afidavit cannot be disputed. -Brooks vs. Ball, 18 Johns, 337. But see
11 Vt. 166. As to the force of promise to pay what a third person shall say is due,
see 1 Greenl Ev. ffl 182, 183, 184.
2Bockenham vs. Thacker, 2 Vent. 71, 74.
3 Train vs. Gold, 5 Pick., 384.
4 Traverse vs. Meres, 1 T. Ray, 82, 153 ; Layworthy vs. Chicester, 1 Freem. 52.
5
Wilkinson vs. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490; Haigh vs. Brooks, 10 A. & E., 309,
323, S. C., 2 P. & D., 477, 4 Id. 288. Aliter, if the possession is not lawful. Pothier,
48; McDonald vs. Neilson, 2 Cowen, 141; McCaleb vs. Price, 12 Ala. 753.
Train vs. Gold, 5 Pick., 384.
7
Aglionby vs. Towers, i Freem. 399; Lampleigh vs. Braithwaite, Hob..88;
Trustees of Hamilton College vs. Stewart, 1 Comst. 581.
8
Com. Dig. Ass. B. 21 Am. Jur, 267-9.
9 Johnson vs. Titus, 2 Hill, 606.
'01 Roll. Abr. 23, pl. 29; Harris vs. Watson, Peake, 72; Festerman vs. Parker,
10 Iredell, 474; Robinson vs. Threadgill, 13 Id. 39, Pothier (Evans) 43-46.
11Griffith vs. Spratley, I Cox, 883 ; Copis vs. Middleton, 2 Mad. 409, 431 ; Prebble ps.Boghurst, 1 Swanst. 829; Gwynne vs. Heaton, 1 Bro. Ch. 5; 1 Story Eq.
Juris. 246.
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.inadequacy of consideration alone, however great, will not justify
the intervention of equity." If it is gross, 2 or relations of peculiar

confidence existed between the parties,3 the presumption of fraud is
more easily raised. And although mere inadequacy will not justify
equity in setting aside a contract, it will prevent a decree of specific
performance, 4 and according to the weight of authority will avoid
.purchases from young heirs of their reversionary interests.5 Reasonable damages only, without regard to those stipulated by the
parties, have been allowed by courts of law in a few instances of
unconscionable agreements, even though no actual fraud could be
presumed from the circumstances. 6 The rule which does not permit
the adequacy of the consideration to be inquired into, does not;
apply to contracts which are made to defraud or prejudice the rights,
of third persons, although they are valid between the contracting7
parties.
§22.- Considerationsclasifie.-A consideration may be created.
by any thing which may be a benefit to the promisor or an injuryto the promisee, and may consist of labor done, money paid, advances
made, credit given, liability or risk incurred, the forbearance or diicharge .of an existing debt, the transfer of any property, real or
personal, or of any right or interest therein. The classification of
considerations in the civil law has passed into the books of the corSee cases cited in the preceding note.
Mott vs. Atwood, 5 Ves. (Sumner ed.) 845, and cases cited in the notes; Hrollett vs. Rose, 3 McLean, .332.
3 Crowe vs. Bullard, 1 Yes. jr. (Sumner ed.) 215, note (2) ; Mortlook vs. Buller,
10 Id. 291; Ormond vs. Hutchinson, 16 Id. 107; Robinson vs. Sohly, 6Geo. 515;
1 Story Eq. Juris. 246.
4 Mortlock vs. Buller, 10 Yes. 292; Watkins vs. Collins, 11 Ohio 31; Osgood vs.
Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 1-23, where the conflicting cases are reviewed and the doctrine of the text held. But see Coles vs. Trecothick, 9 Yes. 246.
5 Coles vs. Trecothick, 9 Yes. 234; Evans vs. Peacock, 16 Id. 512; Gowland v..
De Faria, 17 Id. 20; Osgood vs. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 25.
6 James vs. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111; Thornborow vs. Whiteacre, 2 Ld. Ray. 1164;
8 Mass. 257; 12 Id. '365; 1 Story Eq. Juris. 331; Sedgwick on Damages, Ch. vii..
pp. 215-6.
7Chitty, Cont. 28.
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mon law, but is of little service in practice.1

Such as are valid and

such as are invalid in the common law will now be classified.
§ 23.- Valid consideration8claszified-kTNutual Promises.-Mutual promises are mentioned in the books as a distinct class of con2
siderations, and are sometimes called concurrent considerations.
They designate, however, all contracts except those founded on executed considerations, and apply to all in which something is to be*
done by each party in the fliture, although immediately after the
contract is made. They are exemplified by mutual promises to
marry,3 to buy and sell goods, 4 to forbear a debt and to become
security for its payment.' They constitute a contract, as soon as
the minds of the.parties have met, and before either has begun to
perform his promise. It would seem that the thing promisedalthough to be given or done in the future-rather than the prornise itself constitutes the consideration, there being no benefit in a
mere promise. Mutual promises are said to constitute a consideration in those cases where its performance is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the promise, as where the day appointed
for payment must or may happen before the act is to bd performed
for which the payment is the consideration; or where no tine is
fixed for the performance of that which is the consideration of the
payment or other act to be done at a certain time. '
1

Do ut des-where I give something that you may give something to me.

.Facio

utfacias-where I do something that you may do something for me. Facio ut deswhere I do something that you may give something to me. Do utfacias-where I
give something that you may do something for me, 2 Bla. Comm. 444.
2 Chitty, Cont. 65; Nichols vs. Reynolds, Hob. 88; Livingston vs. Rogers 1
Caines, 584; Tucker vs. Woods, 12 Id. 190; Flannery vs. Dechert, 13 Penn.
State, 505.
3 Harrison vs. Cage, 5 Mod. 412, S. C.; 12 Id. 214; Wightman vs. Coates, 15
Mass. 1.
4 Cro. Eliz. 543, 708, 888, 8 Tohns. 304; Howe vs. Onally, 1 Murph. 287; Appleton vs. Chase, 19 Maine, 74.
s See post, j 27.
6 Pordage vs. Cole, 1 Saunders (Williams), 824, note (4), and cases cited; Couch
vs. Ingersoll, 2 Pick. 300; Quarles vs. George, 23 Id. 400; Babcock vs. Wilson, 17
Maine, 872; Pitkin vs. Fink, 8 Met. 12.
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§ 24.-Mutual promises, to constitute a valid contract, must be
mutually binding-excepting those between adults and infants,
where the contract can be annulled by the infant, but not by the
adult.1 Thus a written agreement to submit disputes to arbitration,
is not binding till 'all the parties have signed it, and are thus
equally bound by it.2 The main question here is to determine when
the parties are mutually bound. Suppose I say to you, if you will
furnish goods or money to a third person, I will see you paid; or if
you will employ him as your agent, I will be responsible for his
fidelity-and here, if you perform the condition within the time my
security is presumed to be offered and before itis withdrawn, I am
bound.3 But until you have performed the condition, .or agreed to
perform it, my offered guaranty is moveable. A simple offer by
one party to sell land or merchandise to another, or buy of him,
whether at public auction or private sale, is without consideration
and may be withdrawn, 4
But, if the offer is accepted at the time before it is retracted, or if
a specified period is fixed within which it is to continue, and within
that period it is accepted-not having been previously withdrawnsuch offer and acceptance constitute a valid contract. In the latter
case the offer is extended through the limited time, and, unless previously retracted, makes up with the acceptance a contract.5 It is
sometimes said that the offer is binding if accepted within a reasonble time after it is made, not having been previously withdrawn.
To us it seems more cbrrect to say that the offer binds if accepted
before actual revocation notified to the offeree, and within the period
I Ward

vs. Clarencieux, 2 Stra. 938; Willard vs. Stone, 7 Cow. 22; Cannon vs.

Alsbury, I Marsh, 76.
2 Chitty Cont. 46; Kingston vs. Phelps, Peake, 299; Biddell vs. Douse, 6 B. &C.
255; Antram. vs. Chase, 15 East. 212.
s Morton vs. Burns, 7 A. & E. 23; Kennaway v8. Treleavan, 5 H. & W. 501;
Barnes vs. Perine, 9 Barb. 210.
4 Payne vs. Cave, 3 T. R. 148. An agreement to give the refusal of a farm by the
owner without the agreement of the other party to buy, is not binding: Barnet vs.
Bisco, 4 Johns. 235; Getman'vs. Getman, 1 Barb. Ch. 499.
5 Bean vs. Burbank, 16 Maine, 480 ; The Boston and Maine R. R. vs. Bartlett, 3
Cush. 224; 20 Am. Jur. 17.
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during which it may be presumed to continue. If'a period is fixed,
that is the presumed time.' If it is not, all the circumstances of
the case must determine the presumption. A more extended consideration of this point would lead us further into the topic of mutual
assent than one subject will allow.
§ 25.-ktarriage.-An agreement between parties to marry, as
we have seen, is founded on a valid consideration,' and marriage
between them is a valid- consideration for the promise of either to
make-a settlement on the other, or of a third person to perform any
act beneficial to either or both.3
§ 26.-! e assignlment of a right of action.-The assignment of
a chose in action transfers the right to the assignee, and is a valid
consideration for a promise--except in a few anomalous cases where
it is forbidden by.public policy. It does not authorize the assignee,
except of negotiable paper, to sue in his own name at law unless
the debtor promises the assignee to pay him, or previously assents
to the assignment.- He must bring the action in the name of the
assignor at law-but in equity he can sue in his own ;6 and the
assignor will not be permitted to defeat his right. The assignment
of possibilities and contingencies without a present interest, not
ordinarily assignable at law, may be enforced in equity.8 If the

I The expressions in

some of the cases that mutual promises, to be binding, must

be made simultane6usly or at the same instant (Nicholson vs. Reynolds, Hob. 88;
Livingston vs. Rogers, I Caines, 584) are only correct as modified by the text.
2 Wightman vs. Coates, 15 Mass. 1.
3 Sterry vs. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261; Bradish vs. Gibbs, 3 Id. 523; Frazer vs.
Western, 1 Barb. Ch. 523; Armfield vs. Armfield, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 311;
Gurvin vs. Chromartie, 11 Iredell, 174; even against creditors, Newburyport Bank
vs. Stone, 13 Pick. 420.
4 Cone Dig. Ass. (B.) 3 Price vs. Seaman, 4B. & C. 528. Mouldsdale vs. Birchall,
2 W. Bl. 820; Page vs. Thrall, 2 Vt. 418; Warren vs. Wheeler, 21 Maine, 484;
Edson vs. Fuller, 2 Foster, (N. H.) 183.
5 Baron vs. Husband, 4 B. &Ad. 611; Crocker vs. Whitney, 10 Mass. 316; Mowry
vs. Todd, 12 Id. 281; Coolidge vs. Ruggles, 15 Id. 387; Gibson vs. Cook, 20 Pick.
18; Parkhurst vs. Dickerson, 21 Id. 810.
6 2 Story Eq. Juris. a 1056, 1057.
7 Manderville vs. Welch, 1 Wheat. 235; S. C. 5 Id. 283.
8 2 Story Eq. Juris. 1040, a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

